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Some Moral Implications of Finding
No State Action
Theodore Y. Blumoff
While the State may have been aware of the dangers that Josh-
ua faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation,
nor did it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to
them.'
The fact is that freedom, like simple absence, of which it is a
species, or like power, to which it sometimes leads, is not nec-
essarily either good or bad in itself.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Our conceptions of justice flow both through and around
prevailing moral norms, in a filtration process to which all judges
are inextricably bound. Professor Lon Fuller, writing a half century
ago, stated the issue this way:
The judge in deciding cases is not merely laying down a
system of minimum restraints designed to keep the bad man in
check, but is in fact helping to create a body of common mo-
Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law; Ph.D., St. Louis University,
1976; J.D., Washington University School of Law, 1982.
Throughout my career, friends kind enough to read and comment on early drafts
and sections of my work product have often saved me from myself. Those generous
enough to comment on this work include Erwin Chemerinsky, Linda Edwards, Fred
Gedicks, Hal Lewis, David Oedel, Jack Sammons, and Sidney Watson. I also presented
draft sections of this work at the Sixth Annual Symposium on "Law, Religion and Ethics"
at Hamline University School of Law in October 1993. Comments by and conversations
with Marie Ashe, Alan Freeman, Emily Hartigan, Howard Lesnick, Betty Mensch, and
Tom Shaffer at that symposium proved extremely helpful. My colleagues at a Faculty
Symposium at Mercer University School of Law provided criticism that significantly im-
proved the final product. Special appreciation is due to former Dean Phil Shelton and
Interim Dean Dick Creswell for providing much needed time and financial support. Final-
ly, Nancy Bladich (J.D., Mercer University School of Law, 1994) provided valuable re-
search assistance.
1 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Sens., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989)
(Rehnquist, CJ.).
2 John Somerville, Toward a Consistent Definition of Freedom and its Relation to
Value, in NoMos TV: LIBERTY 289 (Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1962).
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rality which will define the good man. When he sees his office
in this light, the judge will realize . . . how significantly creative
his work is, and how sinister is the temptation to evade his
responsibilities to the future by adopting a passive and
positivistic attitude toward "the existing law."'
As Fuller understood, judges and justices may earnestly desire and
affirmatively seek to undermine the reality of this creativity, but
they are hopeless to escape it.4 Indeed, unless judges engage in
self-deception by assuming the status of mere technicians, they
are-or should be-aware of the moral authority of judging.'
3 LON L. FULLER, THE Lkw IN QUEST OF ITSELF 137-38 (1940). In Fuller's view.
courts have influenced the "shap[e of] common morality," particularly with respect to
"judge-made law." Id. at 135. But two facts, I think, support the argument that his insight
applies to contemporary constitutional interpretation as well. First, Fuller did not exclude
constitutional jurisprudence from the force of his remarks. Indeed, his sweeping critique
of positivism and its effect on democracy seems unbounded by the common law. See, e.g.,
id. at 118-33. Second, and more importantly, the interpretation of the open-textured
language of the Fourteenth Amendment is very similar to common law interpretation. In
fact, the command of the Equal Protection Clause-equal treatment for those similarly
situated with respect to the law-is a basic tenet of common law adjudication. See, e.g.,
EDWARD LEVi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 3 (1949).
4 Later in life, Fuller seemed to limit the scope of a judge's moral options to
something very similar to procedural morality. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAWe
41-44 (1964) (discussing the "internal morality" of law); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
5 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 30-33 (1962). This does not mean that the Justices are always
free to acknowledge their understanding, although the self-deception discussed in the text
may reflect captivity to "an ideologically induced illusion about the nature of moral on-
tology." CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 9
(1989). Alternatively, they may well realize that the sociology of the Supreme Court limits
disclosure of their complete understanding of the process they shepherd. Here, the real
issues concern the institutional-political and theoretical limitations on the Court's ability
to acknowledge the way it uses precedent.
In many of the Court's more difficult constitutional cases, the Justices consult histor-
ical sources in an effort to reconcile their decision with the intent of the Framers. In
this effort they act like historians, gathering textual evidence before embarking on the
fundamentally imaginative process that deciding these crucial issues compels. Historians,
however, at least appear to have a broader warrant for manipulating their sources than
do Supreme Court Justices, for historians cross-examine their evidence in a creative pro-
cess whose outcome often turns on the idiosyncratic experiences of each scholar. See, e.g.,
R.G. Collingwood, The Historical Imagination, reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY IN
OUR TIME 66 (Hans Meyerhoff ed., 1959) (originally published in R.G. COLLINGWOOD,
THE IDEA OF HISTORY 231-49 (1946)). In fact, the Justices undertake the exact same pro-
cess, but, by contrast, cannot own their creativity. Our notion of justice requires the
Justices to present themselves as the faithful interpreters of an autonomous text. Unlike
historians for whom no text claims autonomy, the Justices are foreclosed from taking per-
sonal responsibility for their original use of source material. Anything less than absolute
allegiance to text risks the charge of "super legislature." See Theodore Y. Blumoff, The
Court's Uses of History, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNIT-
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Some decisions, because of their apparent indifference to the
moral consequences of judging, push us over the edge. DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services6 has done that to
me.7 Since God's cruelest challenge is surely the parent's loss of a
child, the majority opinion's characterization of Joshua DeShaney's
brain death by a brutal father as "undeniably tragic" is jarringly
callous. Indeed, the Court seemed to make the result of the case
appear preordained.8 The opinion's relentless syllogism tried to
scrub away the residue of the choices its facts demanded. But the
issues were not self-deciding. Indeed, like any cert-worthy case,
DeShaney arrived on the Court's docket with respectable arguments
and useful precedent on both sides.'
Although I retell the tragic story of Joshua DeShaney in Part
II, I will not belabor that process because his story has been told
before and often. Rather, I want to use DeShaney as a vehicle to
discuss more generally the morality of judging. To that end, I
examine the opinion itself in Part III and its doctrinal and juris-
prudential underpinnings in Part IV. It is within the choices the
Justices make that the external morality" of judging becomes in-
escapable.
In DeShaney, the currency of those choices was "state action."
This doctrine precludes the finding of a constitutional violation in
the absence of an act attributable to government." Stated simply,
ED STATES 373 (Kermit Hall ed., 1992).
6 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
7 Cf Linda Hirshman, The Virtue of Liberality in American Communal Life, 88 MICH. L.
RE%'. 983, 1020 (1990) (stating that San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1 (1973), had a similar effect on the author).
8 DeShany, 489 U.S. at 191. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun likened the Court's ap-
proach to the "formalistic legal reasoning" espoused by "antebellum judges who denied
relief to fugitive slayes." Id. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
9 See id. at 203-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 212-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
10 I distinguish between Fuller's essentially procedural "internal morality" of judg-
ing-our commitment to written findings, fair process and the like-and the personal
sense of morality each judge or justice brings to the process, which originates outside of
both the adjudicatory process and the moral norms explicit or implicit in the constitu-
tional provision at issue. See infra text accompanying notes 153-64.
11 Government "action" is needed to state a claim against the federal government as
well as against a state government. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
614 (1991); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
While my primary focus in this work is on nonobvious state intrusions and the Four-
teenth Amendment, my conclusions about moral responsibility would also apply in the
context of nonobvious federal intrusions. Of course, the separation of powers concerns
that can influence the Court as it searches for instances of nonobvious federal miscon-
duct are not identical to the federalism issues that the current Court has imported into
1994]
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the Court held that because the actual beating came from
Joshua's father, there was no state action-the Due Process Clause
placed no affirmative obligation on the State to prevent that beat-
ing, no matter what the State's agents knew, or how easily the
beating could have been prevented. I hope to show that neither
the text of the Fourteenth Amendment nor precedent compelled
this result. Instead, with the single and important exception of the
search for state action in race-related cases, the Court has engaged
in line drawing that has turned the state action component of the
Fourteenth Amendment into a forceful shield for the state, rather
than a simple description of when federal protection of individual
liberty is required.
In this process of interpreting state action, the Court has lost
sight of, or deceived itself about, at least one facet of the
doctrine's jurisprudential underpinning. The Supreme Court has
insisted that the state action requirement protects individual liber-
ty by cabining an area of conduct free from federal constraints
and thus insuring a realm of privacy. 2 As many commentators
have noted in various ways, this understanding of state action
permits individuals to make certain choices that enhance "individu-
al autonomy, individual dignity, and pluralism."'3 But as I demon-
strate in Part IV, no conception of privacy-understood as prima
facie freedom from regulation- 4 was enhanced by the DeShaney
opinion.
Instead, the current Court's state action jurisprudence harkens
back to Justice Miller's view of federal power in the Slaughterhouse
instances of colorable state involvement. Nonetheless, the concerns seem similar enough
that any differences should not affect the Court's ethical obligations.
12 "Careful adherence to the 'state action' requirement preserves an area of indi-
vidual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial power." Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982); see also, e.g., NCAA v. Tarkanian,
488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988); Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 1991); Dunham v.
Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 919 F.2d 1281, 1293 (7th Cir. 1990) (Ripple, J., dissent-
ing); Dunwoody Homeowners Ass'n v. DeKalb County, Georgia, 887 F.2d 1455, 1461
(11th Cir. 1989); Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 869
F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1989).
13 Jody Y. Jakosa, Parsing Public from Private: The Failure of Differential State Action Anal-
ysis, 19 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 193, 207 (1984); see also, e.g., LURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18-2, at 1691 (2d ed. 1988) (concluding that the state action
doctrine serves two not wholly compatible interests: federalism and privacy, the latter by
"stop[ping] the Constitution short of preempting individual liberty ... to make certain
choices").




Cases,5 where his stated fear of "fetter[ing] and degrad[ing] state
government" made possible the regime of Jim Crow, an era of our
history virtually devoid of public decency toward the most vulnera-
ble members of society.'
6
In the final section, Part V, I return to the law of Joshua's
case and draw conclusions about the current Court's view of its
role in shaping public morality, including most importantly the
idea that the whole of our state action jurisprudence defines a
significant part of the relationship of each individual to the feder-
al judicial system. Thus, a decision like DeShaney makes at least two
dramatic, if implicit, statements: (1) we are all on our own in this
"free world," relying on government at our peril; and (2) none of
us is highly valued within the federal judicial system. In my view, if
these two statements are true, they speak volumes about the
Court's attitude toward its role in shaping public values.'
I want to clarify that when I address the Supreme Court's role
in creating and reinforcing public moral values, my focus is exclu-
sively on constitutional interpretation. This is not to deny, howev-
er, that the external morality of judging plays a part in statutory
interpretation as well.- My point here is that the two
tasks-constitutional interpretation and statutory interpreta-
ion-are different, for at least three reasons. First, at least with
respect to the open-textured commands of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, constitutional interpretation is more indeterminate than
traditional statutory analysis. Thus, the Court has more room to
choose than is often the case with statutes. Second, the Supreme
Court has often stated that it is freer to revisit constitutional pre-
cedent than statutory interpretation.' The absence of a congres-
sional corrective underlies this willingness to reshape constitutional
precedent. Third, and most important, when Congress enacts
legislation, it defines our public values, and its members are often
mindful of public morality." The primacy of the congressional
15 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
16 See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1974) (trac-
ing the history of segregation in the aftermath of Reconstruction).
17 In this sense, I cannot agree fully with Professor Beermann, who concluded that
the DeShaney Court avoided issues of governmental responsibility for helplessness and the
morality of the state standing by while one individual does violence to another. See Jack
M. Beermann, Administrative Failure and Local Democracy: The Politics of DeShaney, 1990
DuKE LJ. 1078, 1079 n.6. In my view, the Court spoke clearly to a piece of the problem
raised by the first issue.
18 See, e.g., Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989).
19 See, e.g., Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
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role in shaping public values is clearly as it should be in a democ-
racy, at least as a general rule. But when Congress has not spoken,
which is often the case when state action is at issue, the Court
may be the only voice articulating our national conception of
public morality.
II. THE CONTEXT: JOSHUA'S "UNDENIABLY TRAGIC" LIFE20
"The facts of this case," Chief Justice Rehnquist begins, "are
undeniably tragic."'2 1 Joshua DeShaney was born in 1979. One
year later, a Wyoming court consigned him to the custody of his
father, Randy DeShaney, under a 1980 divorce decree. Randy
DeShaney moved with Joshua to Winnebago County, Wisconsin,
remarried, and shortly thereafter divorced a second time. Joshua's
problems were about to begin.
Wisconsin's Department of Social Services (DSS) first became
aware of Joshua's problems in January 1982, when the police de-
partment notified the DSS that Randy DeShaney had abused Josh-
ua. DeShaney denied the charge in an interview, and the DSS let
the matter drop. A year later, Joshua was taken to a local hospital
with multiple bruises and abrasions. The examining physician
suspected abuse and duly informed the DSS. The DSS moved the
court for an order placing Joshua in the nominal, temporary cus-
tody of the hospital. Within seventy-two hours, an ad hoc, interdis-
ciplinary "Child Protection Team" met to determine Joshua's fu-
ture. Everyone involved in this process believed Joshua had been
abused.22 The county attorney, however, for unrecorded reasons,
concluded that there was insufficient evidence of abuse. Accord-
ingly, the Child Protection Team returned Joshua to his father,
although it persuaded Randy DeShaney to agree to cooperate with
the DSS in an effort to protect Joshua. Under this agreement,
Randy DeShaney was to enroll Joshua in a preschool program,
obtain counseling for himself, and make his girlfriend leave the
home. The juvenile court then dismissed the abuse case against
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding religious exemption to Title
VII's prohibition on employment discrimination); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1988) (listing
the findings and purposes of Congress in enacting the Endangered Species Act of 1973).
20 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191. Except as otherwise specifically noted, all of the facts
are taken from the majority opinion, id. at 191-93. and the Petition for Writ of Certiora-
ri, DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., No. 87-154 (July 17, 1987)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file) [hereinafter Cert. Petition].
21 DeSlianey, 489 U.S. at 191.




During the next year, Joshua was repeatedly admitted to the
local hospital, each time bearing suspicious traumatic injuries. In
November 1983, the local hospital again notified the DSS case-
worker of suspected abuse. The caseworker declined to take ac-
tion, but did visit Joshua's house monthly for the next half year.
During these visits, she noted "in detail that seems almost eerie in
light of her failure to act"24 a number of suspicious injuries to
the boy's head and the fact that Randy DeShaney was not abiding
by the terms of the agreement. Toward the end of 1983, the au-
thorities again apprised the DSS of physical abuse to no avail. On
each of the next two visits, the caseworker was told that Joshua
was too ill to be seen.
Finally, in March 1984, the predictable occurred: Randy
DeShaney beat Joshua so severely that Joshua suffered permanent
brain damage. When word of this last blow reached the casework-
er, her response speaks plainly to the level of culpability attending
her failure to intervene: "I just knew the phone would ring some
day and Joshua would be dead."2 5
Despite three trips to the emergency room, strong signals
from the treating physicians, complaints lodged by third parties,
and nearly twenty home visits, the DSS did nothing. And therein
lay Joshua's legal hurdle-for having done nothing, the Court
held, the DSS could not be a state actor subject to substantive due
process limitations.
III. DUTY AND STATE AcTION IN DESHNEY
DeShaney belongs in the universe of cases in which duty and
state action co-extend: if there is no duty, there is no state action,
and vice versa. So the question could be framed as follows: May
the State remain deliberately indifferent to the conduct of one
private party who inflicts an injury on another person if state activ-
ity surrounds that conduct, if the State's agents are or should'be
aware of the potential injury, and if the State has the capacity and
23 "The DSS officials filed their internal report, noting that child abuse was strongly
suspected and promising that they would continue to actively and closely monitor the
child." Id. One of the many ironies of Joshua's story is that the DSS did actively monitor
the case.
24 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 209 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
25 Id. (quoting DeShaney, 812 F.2d 298, 300 (7th Cir. 1987)).
26 Id. at 194-203.
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the formal desire, reflected in statutory warrants to intervene in
abusive situations, to prevent such conduct? Does this form of
"inaction" give rise to a constitutional duty?
The DeShaney opinion's major premise, i.e., that the Due Pro-
cess Clause is "a limitation on the State's power to act, not.., a
guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security,"
2 7
proved dispositive. Indeed, the Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment "confers no affirmative right to governmental aid,
even where such aid may be necessary to secure life."28 It fol-
lowed that "[i]f the Due Process Clause does not require the State
to provide its citizens with particular protective services .... the
State cannot be held liable under the Clause for injuries that
could have been averted had it chosen to provide them."29 No
state action therefore means no duty.
Reaching this conclusion was not as straightforward as the
Court's logic suggested because the idea of "duty" is not self-exe-
cuting. Rather, "duty" reflects a conclusion reached after exam-
ining the interests and expectations implicated and the relation-
ships among the parties involved." Traditionally, interests like
Joshua's vis-a-vis the government have not been highly regarded.
First-semester torts students quickly encounter the common law's
deeply rooted indifference to the humane obligation to take rea-
sonable affirmative steps to help one in obvious need. The able
doctor, we learn, can turn away a sick patient with impunity;"1
one can entice a colleague into a pool of deep water and then
stand idly by and watch that colleague drown;32 and the observer
can even refuse to give warning to a youngster about to be man-
gled in a dangerous machine." All this, we learn, is "nonfea-
27 Id. at 195. Others have elaborated on the formal nature of the opinion. See
Beermann, supra note 17, at 1082; Aviam Soifer, Moral Ambition, Formalism and the "Free
World" of DeShaney, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1513 (1989).
28 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196.
29 Id. at 196-97.
30 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAv OF TORTS § 53, at
356-59 (5th ed. 1984). One might well ask why an analysis from tort law should be used
to determine duties of a constitutional nature. The brief answer is twofold: First, where
else would one look for context other than the law of torts and cimes? Second, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly looked to tort law to explicate 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is
the primary vehicle for stating constitutional violations against the states. See Harold S.
Lewis, Jr. & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Re.haping Section 1983s Asymmety, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
755, 764-67 (1992).
31 See Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058 (Ind. 1901).
32 See Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1959).
33 See Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809 (N.H. 1898). Similar cases are collected in
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sance" for which no liability lies. Yet this doctrine of nonfeasance
is a radical, insupportable distinction between what is moral and
what is legal; it is premised either on a misguided sense of rugged
individualism or a radical Millian notion of noninterference with
individual liberty. 4
But the modem common law has come to recognize the
inhumanity of its own predilections. Whether the nonfeasance
norm traces its origins to a Darwinian conception of social evolu-
tion or a Millian bias for virtually unmitigated liberty, the nonfea-
sance norm recognizes an exception that is codified in section 324
of the Second Restatement of Torts-
One who, being under no duty to do so, takes charge of an-
other who is helpless adequately to aid or protect himself is
subject to liability to the other for any bodily harm caused to
him by
(a) the failure of the actor to exercise reasonable care to
secure the safety of the other while within the actor's charge,
or
(b) the actor's discontinuing his aid or protection, if by so
doing he leaves the other in a worse position than when the
actor took charge of him."
The DeShaney Court implicitly recognized this exception, not-
ing that after the DSS took temporary custody of Joshua and re-
turned him to his father, "it placed him in no worse position than
that in which he would have been had it not acted at all .... Under
these circumstances, the State had no constitutional duty to pro-
tect Joshua [indefinitely] ."36
KEETON ET AL, supra note 30, § 56, at 375 nn.22, 23 & 28.
34 See Robert L. Hale, Prima Facie Toits, Combination, and Non-Feasance, 46 COLUM. L.
RE%'. 196, 214 (1946). But see Richard Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD.
151, 198-200 (1973) (arguing that imposing a duty to act for the benefit of another
creates unprincipled social interference with individual liberty).
35 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 (1965).
36 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Sers., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989)
(emphasis added). Interestingly, the Court cited § 323 of the Second Restatement, the
more general exception. Section 324 is a particular application of the exception, more
closely on point in this case. See RESTATEMENrr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 cmt. a (1965).
The Seventh Circuit had omitted entirely any consideration of § 324, choosing instead to
approach the issue of tort liability through a causation analysis. Judge Posner, a former
torts professor and the author of a number of works on the rescue doctrine, concluded
that the DSS's role in causation was "trivial," because "if the Department had never exist-
ed, Joshua would have sustained the [same] injuries for which he is seeking damages in
this suit." DeShaney, 812 F.2d 298, 302-03 (7th Cir. 1987).
Asking the counteifactual question, "what if the DSS never existed" is simply the
19941
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The Court failed, however, to answer the central question
posed by section 324(b): a position worse than what? Section
324(b)'s text gives one answer: "a worse position than when the
actor took charge of him." But that answer fails, and the question
persists because of the discontinuity among section 324(b)'s plain
text, the mission of rescue, and the example the Restatement's
drafters give to illustrate the operation of this subsection. 7 Com-
ment g states:
If the actor has succeeded in removing the other from a posi-
tion of danger to one of safety, he cannot change his position
for the worse by unreasonably putting him back into the same
peril, or into a new one. Thus, while A, who has taken B from
a trench filled with poisonous gas, does not here obligate him-
self to pay for B's treatment in a hospital, he cannot throw
him back into the same trench, or leave him lying in the street
where he may be run over.'
If we determine "worse position" solely by reference to the literal
meaning of the text-"than when the actor took charge of
him"-A should be able to put B back in the trench without
breaching the duty section 324 creates, for under these circum-
stances A has, to quote Chief Justice Rehnquist, "placed him in no
worse position than that in which he would have been had [A] not
acted at all."39
Imbedded in comment g's hypothetical is an assumption that
most of us would find morally reprehensible: that the rescuer,
having the ability and opportunity to pull B from the trench,
would opt for placing B back into the trench without any good
reason. To make sense of section 324's obligation, therefore, and
to give some meaning to the ontology of rescue, "no worse posi-
tion" must mean something else, e.g., "no worse than the best
position the rescuer achieved after the rescue effort began." If this
wrong way of approaching cause-in-fact. The traditional question-and the one on which
plaintiffs would have borne the risk of nonpersuasion had the case gone forward-is
almost the opposite: But for the agency's failure to intervene effectively at an earlier
date, would Joshua have suffered permanent injuries? The question must be phrased this
way because if Joshua would have suffered the same permanent injury despite the
defendant's allegedly substandard conduct, i.e. its failure to intervene, the plaintiff is not
entitled to recover. KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 41, at 264-65. So we are at least left
to speculate about why Judge Posner framed the question as he did.
37 See DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL AccoUNTABILITY FOR
INJURY 415 n.2 (1985).
38 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 cmt. g (1965).
39 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 (emphasis added).
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is the duty section 324 imposes, DeShaney simply missed the point.
In so doing, moreover, the Court failed to give Joshua DeShaney
and his natural mother a chance to prove that by initially taking
charge of Joshua, the DSS put him in a worse position than he
had achieved both when it acquiesced in Joshua's return to his
father and when it failed to remove him once again from his fa-
ther.4" The DSS threw Joshua back into the trench.
The Court characterized the DSS's conduct sub rosa as nonfea-
sance. But even this process is troublesome and ultimately norma-
tive. For example, in the estimable old case of Newton v. Ellis,4
the defendant, under contract with the local health board to dig
wells, failed to set out lights when leaving work one evening. As a
result, the plaintiff's carriage fell into the unlit hole causing injury.
Although the litigation context is not entirely clear, an attempt
was made to characterize the defendant's conduct as nonfea-
sance-an omission to light the hole. Lord Campbell disagreed:
The action is brought for an improper mode of performing
the work. How can that be called a nonfeasance? It is the do-
ing unlawfully what might be done lawfully: digging improperly
without taking the proper steps for protection from inju-
ry .... Cases . . . [of] mere nonfeasance are inapplicable: the
action here is for doing what was positively wrong.
42
One might well ask whether Lord Campbell's second declarative
sentence represents conclusion or description. Surely, the contract-
ing company's misconduct was an omission. That it was part of a
larger project-and thus constituted action-was a normative judg-
ment wholly dependent on competing conceptions of the scope of
the project and on unarticulated norms of behavior. As Lord Per-
son wrote a century later: "If a hole is dug on Monday and on
Tuesday somebody falls into it, is the accident due to the static
condition prevailing on Tuesday or to the operations which took
place on Monday?""
3
40 I am assuming as well that the Court would require something more than mere
negligence in the breach of § 324. See DeShany, 812 F.2d at 302 (assuming that the
DSS's failure to intervene was a "sufficiently aggraiated form of negligence to escape the
bar of" Daniels v. williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), and Daidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344
(1986), "which hold that simple negligence does not vriolate section 1983").
41 119 Eng. Rep. 424 (KIB. 1855).
42 Id. at 427. The actual holding of the case deals ith whether or not the defen-
dant came within the terms of a statute.
43 Videan v. British Transp. Comm'n, 2 Q.B. 650, 678 (1963), [1963] 2 All E.R. 860,
874.
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Lord Person's question is itself not self-answering. It is answer-
able only by assessing the defendant's conduct against a normative
baseline that reflects the measure of social responsibility we choose
for our society. The Deshaney Court's nonfeasance determination
was similarly normative-it reveals the Justices' allotment of federal
protection for the most vulnerable members of our society.
IV. OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIVES: THE DOCTRINE AND
JURISPRUDENCE OF STATE ACTION
"While the State may have been aware of the dangers that
Joshua faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation,
nor did it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to
them." 4 Consequently, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded, cau-
tion is required: Before yielding to the impulse to sympathize with
Joshua and award "adequate compensation for the grievous harm
inflicted upon [him,] ... it is well to remember once again that
the harm was not inflicted by the State of Wisconsin, but by
Joshua's father."45 The State simply stood by and did nothing.
The injuries suffered, in other words, issued from private, not
public, misconduct. Accordingly, the State breached no duty recog-
nized by the substantive component of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.
This section explores the three subjects implicit in DeShaney's
holding: (1) the public/private distinction; (2) the "freedom"
which the designation "private" begets; and (3) the "state action"
case law which, in part, is deemed to protect the private realm.
The discussion serves as grounding for the conclusion that
DeShaney served none of the values of the public/private distinc-
tion.
A. Of Public and Private Life
"A complete human being," the moral philosopher Stuart
Hampshire writes, "has two human faces, one a communicative,
consensus-seeking, politically active, reasonable face .... [and] the
other a private and autonomous, perhaps detached and secretive,
uncompromising face of a person pursuing his own distinctive
good, perhaps guided in this by a comprehensive morality."" We
44 DeShany, 489 U.S. at 201.
45 Id. at 202-03.
46 Stuart Hampshire, Liberalism: The New Twist, N.Y. REv. BKS., 43, 44 (Aug. 12,
1993) (reiewing JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAl. LIBERALISM (1993)).
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live both public and private lives, but what we cherish as public
and private is not self-defining. Rather, "public-ness" and "private-
ness" depend in large part on how we use the terms. Our use of
the terms reflects the contingent nature of our social and cultural
history. Hampshire suggests that the need to distinguish between
public and private spheres of life is cross-cultural. If so, these
spheres contain different attributes from culture to culture be-
cause what we designate as public and private is "inherently nor-
mative" and sensible "only... by reference to norms of behav-
ior."
47
Efforts to separate the public from the private within our cul-
ture-to mark for all time the boundary between regulable and
nonregulable-come to naught. As Robert Dahl noted, "[e]fforts
to define the domain [of personal choice] ... always fail."4" In-
deed, they must fail because our social and cultural history is itself
contingent. Any organizing principle we might devise to sort pub-
lic from private could, by definition, account only for past norms
of behavior, if it can account for any separation at all. The ongo-
ing nature of contingency, moreover, means at least that our hy-
pothetical principle cannot foresee its own future applicability.49
But the inability to escape contingency has not prevented us
from attempting to describe the various functions served by public
and private realms. For example, Benn and Gaus postulate three
senses in which we use the terms "public" and "private."5 They
note that we sometimes use the terms to connote "access" or ac-
47 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privaoy: Community and Self in the Common
Law Tort, 77 CAl.. L. REv. 957, 969 (1989); accord Stanley I. Bern & Gerald F. Gaus, The
Public and the Private: Concepts and Actions, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 3, 5
(Stanley I. Benn & Gerald F. Gaus eds., 1983) (noting that the relationship among the
ways in which the terms are used depends as much on ideology as logic).
The normative nature of privateness is well illustrated with the simple reminder
about community life in Europe before the Reformation. At that time, the major distinc-
tion among western polities was temporal versus spiritual rather than private versus pub-
lic. Thus, whereas we today ask whether certain conduct, such as religious belief, is con-
signed to the public or private sphere, the Augustinian world asked if the conduct uas of
this world or God's. The idea that one could relegate religion or religious practice to a
.private" sphere would have lacked any coherence in the western world before the En-
lightenment. See id.
48 ROBERT A. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION? AUTHORITY IN A GOOD SOCIE'TY 19
(1970), quoted in Francis Canavan, The Pluralist Game, 44 LAWN & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1981, at 23, 26.
49 On the self-contradictory nature of prediction, see Peter Medawar, Expectation and
Prediction, in PLUTO's REPUBLIC 309 (1982) (summarizing the ideas of Karl Popper).
50 Benn & Gaus, supra note 47, at 7-11.
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cessibility to the following: territory, activities, information about
oneself,5 and resources. To be "private" in this use is to control
accessibility. We also use the terms as a shorthand for questions of
"agency": Is someone acting for or on his own behalf-that is,
privately-or for the community, a public entity? Finally, we can
designate the nature of the "interest" involved in certain activities
by reference to public and private, i.e., whether something is said
or done for the public's or a private citizen's gain or loss.52
The key in this discussion of DeShaney and the external moral-
ity of judging is that if we deem a matter private in any of the
senses described above, we assume at least a presumptive entitle-
ment to engage in that conduct free from regulation. Thus, gov-
ernment generally bears the burden of demonstrating why this
particular conduct should not remain unencumbered.5 3 Moreover,
implicit in this understanding of privacy as "prima facie free from
regulation" is the understanding that "privacy," whether viewed as
having only instrumental value or some ultimate value, 5 depends
on the ability to choose. "Private," used to invoke some measure
of freedom, "is understood in terms of a range of options
available to an agent who is seen, at least potentially, as a choos-
er." 5 This chooser must of necessity have the capacity to make
meaningful choices, else the deprivation of privacy is meaningless.
"Private" used to denote "freedom from regulation" lacks
51 Cf. Cavison, supra note 14, at 6 (contending that to be private is to be unknown
and unobserved). Charles Fried has elevated this sense of privacy to a conditio sine qua
non of personhood, arguing that "without privacy," relationships of love, respect, friend-
ship and trust "are simply inconceivable." Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477
(1968). See generally Stanley I. Benn, Privay, Freedon, and Respect for Persons, in NOMOS
XIII: PRIVACY 1 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971).
52 Gavison, supra note 14, at 6, partially truncates these two categories, noting that
the individual-versus-society use of these terms are a function of the size of the group,
but that when we use '"private" in this sense, we are speaking about self-regarding con-
duct.
53 See id. at 7-9. The "generally" qualification acknowledges that sometimes even "pri-
vate" activities, such as conveyances of real estate, must abide by certain publicly-imposed
formalities that limit private choices. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REN'. 1685, 1691-92 (1976).
54 Compare Somerville, supra note 2, at 290 (concluding that "there is no necessary
relation between freedom, as such, and value") with Fried, supra note 51, at 477 (opining
that privacy is more than an instrumental value; it is necessary for love, respect, friend-
ship and trust; that "without privacy [these relations] are simply inconceivable").
55 See Somerville, supra note 2, at 295 ("Of course, no freedom can be acted on
unless there is the power, the capacity, to act. But freedom is freedom, whether it is
acted on or not."); W.L. Weinstein, The Private and the Free: A Conceptual Inquiry, in NO-
MOS XIII: PRIVACY, supra note 51, at 27, 34.
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content and therefore value. "[F]reedom is, in an inescapable
sense, negative, involving always an indication that something is
absent."56 As such it is "amoral." To place a value judgment on
freedom, we have to consider the context; the values we attach to
freedom "follow[] from the existence or nonexistence of a particu-
lar freedom in a particular context."57
While we might consider some freedoms as prepolitical in the
sense that they do not depend upon the formation of government
for their continued exercise,58 it is also the case that govern-
ment-including the Court-can play a significant role in con-
structing preferences for those freedoms. Law, Professor Cass
Sunstein writes, "reinforce [s] social understandings about presump-
tive rights of ownership," public or private, which, in turn, affect
perceptions about the importance and value of the preference.
To the extent that law is defined either by the common law or
common law-like interpretations of our constitutions, judges affect
public perception. An exclusive focus on individual rights, includ-
ing privacy as freedom from regulation, tends to "obscur[e] and
distort[] the reality of the social construction of rights and du-
ties."'" One might well ask, therefore, what kind of "free world"
DeShaney both reflects and constructs. What kind of "free world"
requires us to live as "choosers" in a protected private world
whose constituting document provides no redress for a child
abused, even as the knowing state sits idly on the sidelines and
watches?
B. The Variety of Freedoms
Free, then, from or for what? "State action," the Court has
written, "preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the
reach of federal law and federal judicial power."6 We can deter-
56 Somerville, supra note 2, at 295.
57 Id. at 299.
58 For example, it is difficult to imagine that the constitutors of our government did
so in order to impinge upon the rights of individuals to make choices about reproduc-
tion. That it never occurred to them to do so is sufficient evidence to suggest that the
"right," which undeniably preceded government, was retained after its formation.
59 Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 8 (1991).
60 Morton J. Horowitz, Rights, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 393, 403-04 (1988); accord
Sunstein, supra note 59, at 9 (noting, in this light, that it is very difficult to accept pref-
erences "as given" or as the basis for decisions in a global sense). See generally JON
ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES (1983).
61 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982); see also, e.g., NCAA v.
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988); Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 1991);
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mine whether individual freedom is served in a particular case
only by measuring the result in that case against the types of free-
doms or privacy interests that might be served. In this section, I
attempt to set out the baselines for making this measurement.
Privacy as freedom, it turns out, is multi-sensed, claiming no fewer
than four different values.
First, when the Court spoke about the "free world" it might
have meant nothing more than the routine use of the word "free"
as opposed to "incarcerated." That is undoubtedly a part of its
intended usage; the placement of the "free world" quote in the
DeShaney opinion underscores this meaning.62 Much suggests,
however, that this was not the only meaning. The Court's discus-
sion of both rescue and causation suggests that something else was
at work." After all, if the only crucial facts were lack of custody
and the identity of the perpetrator, then these discussions were
not just dicta, they were irrelevancies. But even if we were to limit
our understanding of "free" to the antonym of "incarcerated," we
could still read DeShaney for instruction about the type of freedom
one can enjoy in the nonincarcerated world. Given the punish-
ment that would befall Joshua, the freedom our society has to
offer Joshua is questionable at best.
Second, the "free world" the Court spoke about could refer to
freedom from government interference regarding child-rearing
decisions.' This sense of freedom has at least two dimensions,
one dealing with agency, i.e., who speaks for Joshua, and one with
access, i.e., who controls the gate to Joshua's home life. Thus,
freedom may mean nonregulation generally with respect to deci-
sionmaking about childcare. Alternatively, it could signify a partic-
ularized freedom from physical interference in the home. In ei-
ther sense, even state intervention to prevent child abuse could be
viewed as infringing on the associational interests of family65 or
Dunham v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 919 F.2d 1281, 1293 (7th Cir. 1990) (Ripple,
J., dissenting); Dunwoody Homeowners Ass'n v. DeKalb County, Georgia, 887 F.2d 1455,
1461 (11th Cir. 1989); Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist.,
869 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1989).
62 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9 (discussing the potential implications of a deci-
sion by the state to remove Joshua from "free society").
63 Conpare supra text accompanying note 39 (discussing the Court's truncated treat-
ment of the duty to rescue issue) with supra text accompanying notes 3043 (discussing a
more extended, traditional tort approach to rescue issues).
64 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203.
65 Horowitz, supra note 60, at 403. A significant feminist critique concludes that
protecting the integrity of the family leaves women and children particularly vulnerable to
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the integrity of Joshua's or his father's personhood.
It would be a substantial mistake to dismiss this freedom as a
general matter. Absent dire emergencies, we should hesitate and
hesitate again before creating incentives to displace parental deci-
sionmaking or to remove children from their homes. But there
are at least three responses to this danger. First, the state clearly
does contemplate that under the proper circumstances, children
will-in fact must-be removed from, the family home for their
own welfare." As a general matter, therefore, there is no reason
to withhold federal liability for fear of creating incentives for re-
moval in a proper case. Second, to the extent that incentives may
be created to remove quickly or face liability, they can be, and
have been, substantially controlled through the law of § 1983 by
controlling the level of culpability required for recovery' and by
normal implementation of immunity defenses.69 Third, it borders
perversion to dignify any associational interest in the context, and
no such interest ever trumps brutal child abuse."0
the kind of violence experienced in DeShaney. See generally CATHERINE A. MAcKINNON,
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 191 (1989); Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of
State Intervention in the Family 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 835 (1985); Frances E. Olsen, The
Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1568
(1983) [hereinafter Olsen, The Family and the AMarket].
66 Benn, supra note 51, at 6, explains this form of freedom:
What [the bystander] resents is surely that [Henry] Higgins [in recording Eliza
Doolittle's speech during Act I of Pygmalion] fails to show proper respect for
persons; he is treating people as objects or specimeis-like 'dirt'-and not as
subjects with sensibilities, ends, and aspirations of their own, morally responsible
for their own dpcisions, and capable, as mere specimens are not, of reciprocal
relations with the observer-
67 See, e.g., WiS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993-1994); see also
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
68 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987) (holding that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause requires establishing that the challenged activity was undertaken "'because of,'
not merely 'in spite of' its adverse effects") (quoting Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 279 (1979)); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (requiring more than
negligence to demonstrate a "deprivation" under the Fourteenth Amendment); Davidson
v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986),(same).
69 It is difficult even to describe the proof that would be required were plaintiffs to
sue successfully the county entity in a case such as DeShaney. Suffice it to say that the
plaintiffs would have to establish a recurring failure to intervene in abusive situations. See
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
70 The Court alluded to another potential federalism interest with the cryptic, almost
pro forma shibboleth that "the Due Process Clause . . . does not transform every tort
committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation." DeShany, 489 U.S. at 202
(citations omitted). The unarticulated interest would be fear of the redistributive conse-
quences of a contrary holding.
There are a number of ways to respond to this concern short of further choking
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We also employ the idea of "freedom" more globally, as in
comprehensively private and entirely self-regarding. For John Stu-
art Mill, this comprehensive libertarianism recognized only one
limitation:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually
or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of
their number is self-protection. The only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civi-




On this view, unless one "person's conduct affects prejudicially the
interests of others," society lacks jurisdiction over the individual;
but, if the basic proscription is violated, "the question whether the
general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it,
becomes open to discussion."72 The tremendous weight the Court
places on the fact of custody underscores the idea that this is at
least one significant notion of freedom that drives the Court's con-
ception of the Due Process Clause. Thus, the Due Process Clause
is activated only when the person affecting the individual is the
State or another person in the custody of the State.
Finally, freedom as a prima facie entitlement to noninterfer-
ence may refer to voluntary, consensual servitude to a right way of
living in a comprehensive community.73 This form of freedom
places an enormous premium on rationality, for it may, perhaps
counterintuitively, require the adherent to relinquish certain free-
doms. 4 This species of freedom finds constitutional support be-
off due process, see, e.g., Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), or further ham-
pering recovery under § 1983 or its Bivens counterpart, see, e.g., City of St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). First, the
citations above suggest that the Court has already gone a long way toward eliminating
the Due Process Clause as a source of constitutional torts. Second, to the extent that tort
law does provide the basis of constitutional violations, the Court has substantially en-
hanced the level of culpability required to satisfy a prima facie case. Daniels, 474 U.S. at
330-31. Finally, it is difficult to understand what sources other than tort law or the com-
mon law of crimes one would consult as background for establishing the contours of
constitutional violations. In that sense, the shibboleth above is almost disingenuous.
71 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER WRITINGS 135 (Mary
Warnock ed., 1962).
72 Id. at 205.
73 See Michael Walzer, A Note on Positive Fieedom in Jenwish Thought, I S'VARA 7 (1990).
74 Donald H. Regan, Justifications for Paternalism, in NoMos XV: THE LIMITS OF THE
LAw 189, 190-91 (. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1974), notes that one of
the traditional justifications for paternalism holds that coercive intervention is justified
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yond state action and in the privacy mandated by the Establish-
ment Clause. Joshua's lack of capacity, however, undermines any
contrivable interest in this variation of freedom to which the
Court could have alluded.
C. State Action
Privacy as freedom from regulation, i.e., as imposing a restric-
don on government access to certain individual decisions, consti-
tutes one of the interests to which the state action doctrine minis-
ters. This section examines briefly the Court's pre-DeShaney state
action precedents. It does so because fair criticism of the Court
for failing to decide a particular case in a particular way requires
that at least three conditions be present.' First, one must be able
to make the case that the Justices were unconstrained by the clear
intent of the drafters of die provision at issue. Our commitment
to democratic principles charges us with nothing less. Second, the
Court must have maneuvering room within the confines of its own
precedent-it must not be foreclosed by past precedent, fairly con-
strued. Third, even if past precedent is not unambiguously on
point, the developing contours of past dicta, combined with exist-
ing precedent, suggest one, fairly unambiguous outcome. In such
a case, it may be unwarranted (and at least questionable) to cri-
tique the Court for failing to travel along the unfolding landscape.
As the following section demonstrates, measured against these
three principles of fair criticism, the DeShaney opinion was not
predetermined.
As a feature of our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, the
demand for state action followed the Reconstruction Congress's
failed early efforts to extend some measure of social equality to
newly freed slaves in the form of an open accommodations act.
when the target individual lacks relevant information about the consequences of his acts.
Professor Regan suggests that the warrant for this interference is tied to the nexus be-
tween freedom and rationality, but he professes an inability to understand that connec-
tion. Id. at 191. I think the underpinnings of this relationship turn on the appreciation
that (a) we are entitled to use our freedom to bind ourself in ways that eliminate free-
dom in the future, for example, when we enter long term contracts; and (b) marital
commitments to the contrary, we permit such binding, but only when we are or could
be reasonably aware of the consequences of that act. The logic of freedom to constrain
oneself is treated in the seminal work JON EISTER, U.YSSES AND THE SIRENS (1979).
75 These ideas were first developed in a statutory context in Theodore Y. Blumoff &
Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title V71: A Common-Law Outlook on a StatutoOy
Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1, 72-73 (1990).
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The Supreme Court refused to project federal authority in the
absence of some "obnoxious" use of state authority. Justice Bradley
wrote of the Fourteenth Amendment that "[i]t is State action of a
particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of indi-
vidual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment."76 The
Court continued:
[U]ntil some State law has been passed, or some State action
through its officers or agents has been taken, adverse to the
[Fourteenth Amendment] rights of citizens .... no legislation
of the United States under said amendment, nor any proceed-
ing under such legislation, can be called into activity: for the
prohibitions of the amendment are against State laws and acts
done under State authority.
77
Accordingly, individual wrongdoing, however heinously motivated,
would escape federal statutory prohibition unless "some shield of
State law or State authority" accompanied the misconduct.78 The
national court system was otherwise closed.
In addition to protecting a sphere of individual liberty, we
also view the state action doctrine as a federalism limitation that
protects the state from federal intrusions. The Civil Rights Cases
stand for no less. 9 But that view is at least incomplete. If there is
state action in nonobvious situations, the putative defendant is
usually an individual acting under or at the fringe of some state
authority, and not the State through the policies or practices of its
subdivisions, agencies, and employees. If there is no state action,
however, there will often be no claim against the State at all, un-
der state or federal law. Thus, absent active misconduct by the
State, the state action requirement limits any invasion of the State,
which now generally bears no federal constitutional responsibility
to legislate affirmatively or otherwise undertake an active commit-
ment to protect individual liberties.
That absence of responsibility follows from the Civil Rights
76 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
77 Id. at 13.
78 Id. at 17.
79 The Court found support for its narrow reading of the Fourteenth Amendment
in the Tenth Amendment, the font of federalism, which reserved primary responsibility
for guaranteeing individual liberties to the state, notwithstanding the Civil War. Id. at 15.
See generally Jesse H. Choper, Thoughts on State Action: The "Government Function" and "Power
Theory" Approaches, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 757, 762 (arguing that "obliterating the distinction
between state action and private action . . . eviscerate[s] the fourteenth amendment's
restriction on the authority of the national government vis-a-vis the states" regarding the
regulation of individual relationships).
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Cases, which made the unmistakable point that the common law
permits individuals to undermine values that would command
constitutional protection were those same values infringed by some
affirmative state conduct."0  While an unlawful imprisonment
might, for example, find redress in a common law tort against the
wrongful jailer, the defendant's discriminatory animus alone"'
would not implicate a constitutional guarantee. Conventional wis-
dom thus holds that common law norms of conduct are simply
background, the ambient creatures of nature,82 and that official
inaction, which can surely serve as a cover for discriminatory con-
duct undertaken by "private" actors, generally fails to create state
action.
The remainder of this section is a partial challenge to the
conventional wisdom. State action today generally makes a radical
sub rosa distinction between issues implicating race and, with only
a few First Amendment exceptions,83 all other issues. When race
is implicated, the shield erected by state inaction may suffice to
turn a private actor into a guarantor of civil rights; official state
"inaction" may constitute "state action." With only a narrow excep-
tion, when issues other than race are involved, however, the plain-
tiff must demonstrate something very close to intentional state
misconduct, thus creating a redundant probe for the appropriate
80 The Civil Rights Cases contain language that could be read more broadly to per-
mit Congress to prohibit any unjust laws, common or statutory. The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. at 14 (An act of Congress "does not profess to be corrective of any constitu-
tional wrong committed by the States; ... [i]t applies equally to ...States which have
the justest laws respecting the personal rights of citizens."). That conceivable reading,
however, cannot be squared with, among other things, the furor that arose when Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), was decided. See infra text accompanying notes 85-87.
81 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988) (prohibiting conspiracies to deprive persons
of equal protection).
82 See Louis M. Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a
Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006, 1016-17 (1987); Mark
Tushnet, Shelley v. Kraemer and Theories of Equality, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 383, 397-98
(concluding that state action protects majoritarian decision-making from judicial scrutiny).
See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legao, 87 CoiUM. L. REv. 873 (1987).
83 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (constitutionalizing the com-
mon law of defamation without mentioning the need for some affirmative state act);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (finding state action sufficient to implicate
speech and religion rights in a company-owned town); TRIBE, supra note 13, § 18-6, at
1711-15 (distinguishing New York Times and Shelley v. Kraemer on the basis of the under-
lying claims raises two interesting questions: First, why distinguish cases that came out the
same way? Second, what does the underlying claim have to do with "state action"?) As it
turns out, the underlying claim has everything to do with "state action," but this cannot
be a result of the Framers' intent or the amendment's language.
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level of culpability.84 Under these circumstances, only affirmative
action suffices. The three categories of state action inquiry are:
race/inaction cases, nonrace/action cases, and nonrace/inaction
cases.
1. Race and Inaction
The links among race, discrimination by private individuals
in the ordering of their affairs, and the inactive State were forged
in a dispute centering on the legality of a restrictive covenant that
arose immediately after World War II. By executing contracts,
individuals commit themselves to future performance. Contract law
thus partakes of all the attributes of privacy. A restraint on alien-
ation, for example, controls access to territory (the land whose
saleability is confined), defines agency (on whose behalf the signa-
tories to the agreement act), and designates interest (again, what
persons are bound by parallel agreements). When the Court de-
clared in Shelley v. Kraemer that "[tihe Constitution confers upon
no individual the right to demand action by the State which re-
sults in the denial of equal protection,"85 thereby prohibiting
state judicial enforcement of "private agreements, . . . which have
as their purpose the exclusion of persons of designated race ...
from the ownership or occupancy of real property,""8 the hold of
the Civil Rights Cases seemed broken.
But even the critics of Shellef 8 allow that "[t]he outcome ...
[was] morally right," especially in context: African-Americans had
fought and died fighting Nazism in Europe.89 Commentators
84 See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (holding that something more
than negligence is required to sustain a claim of "deprivation" under the fourteenth
amendment). There is an exception to this culpability search: when the deprivation of a
property interest is alleged, the performance of even ministerial tasks triggers due process
protections. See, e.g., Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988);
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
85 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
86 Id. at 4 (stating the issue in the case).
87 See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Touard Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 -LARv.
L. REv. 1, 29-31 (1959) (questioning why state recognition of an agreement, which the
Supreme Court acknowledged the individuals had a right to enter, constituted state ac-
tion). See generally Maimon Schwarzschild, Value Pluralism and the Constitution: In Defense of
the State Action Doctrine, 1988 SuP. CT. REv'. 129 (finding a defense for the outcome in
Shelley, but nonetheless questioning the opinion's doctrinal soundness).
88 How can it be, critics asked, that an individual retained the liberty to enter into
i'estrictive covenants, but that the attempt to enforce that essentially private right gener-
ated impermissible public action when the individuals sought to vindicate the right in
court? See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 87, at 29-31.
89 Schwarzschild, supra note 87, at 153; cf. Lino A. Graglia, State Action: Constitutional
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more sympathetic to the Court's efforts in Shelley concur. Professor
Mark Tushnet reasons that the case is not about privacy in deci-
sionmaking because there is little doubt the State could regulate
racially restrictive covenants. Rather, the case is really about wheth-
er the majority can regulate housing however it sees fit while the
State stands by passively." Similarly, Professor Allen writes that
racially restrictive covenants, by being perceived as "private," simply
permitted the rest of society to turn a blind eye to the moral
repugnancy of institutional racism. In this view, as in Tushnet's,
the Court's opinion made it both illegal and morally repugnant to
allow continued apathy while the private housing market excluded
African-Americans on account of race.9'
Another attempt to use state power to perpetuate discrimina-
tion in public accommodations, this time in a privately-owned
restaurant located in a public parking garage, was declared uncon-
stitutional state action in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority."
The Court found impermissible state conduct in a number of acts,
including the presence of the state flag waving above the facility
and "at appropriate places thereon official signs indicating the
public character of the building," the public ownership of the
building, the failure of the state agency to demand nondiscrimina-
tion in its contract with the restaurateur (that is, state inaction),
and the conferral of mutual benefits. 3
Phoenix, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 777, 788 (1989) (commenting that Shello , "illustrates with stark
clarity both the Court's belief and the truth that it is exempt from any requirement that
its opinions make sense").
90 Tushnet, supra note 82, at 397.
91 Francis A. Allen, Remembering Shelley v. Kraemer- Of Public and Private Worlds, 67
WASH. U. L.Q. 709, 714-15 (1989).
92 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 1belaware law was ambiguous. A Delaware statute, as con-
strued, may have affirmatively permitted discrimination if failing to do so would be "of-
fensive" to most other customers. Id. at 726-27 (Stewart, J., concurring). However, the
very need to adjudicate this case suggests that in the apartheid days preceding the 1964
Civil Rights Act the restaurateur's appetite for racial discrimination would have been tol-
erated if undertaken without state authority.
93 Id. at 724. The Court's discussion of the "benefits mutually conferred" under the
lease arrangement noted that the state enjoyed revenue that resulted from discrimination,
and conferred tax breaks upon and provided other financial benefits to the private party.
This created a "Catch-22." Had the agency refused to tax the restaurant and thus fore-
gone the ill-gotten benefits, it would have provided a windfall to the discriminator. On
the other had, by accepting the taxes, it benefitted from discrimination. I read this to
mean that the agency had two-and only two-permissible choices: refuse to lease entire-
ly, or lease but demand a non-discrimination condition, i.e., demand action. See GEOFFREY
R. STONE Er AL, CONSTITUTIONAL LmW 1633 (2d ed. 1991); TRIBE, supra note 13, § 18-7,
at 1715.
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The private exploitation of political signs and symbols to
effectuate racial discrimination may also provide some explanation
for the "white primary" cases.94  For example, in Smith v.
Allwright," the Court found state action, despite the absence of
explicit state approval for the discriminatory conduct, in two fea-
tures of the case. First, a host of statutes and regulations surround-
ed the procedure by which the all-white primary electorate elected
the nominee who was eventually placed on the general election
ballot. 6 Second, the Court stated that in the context of a consti-
tutional democracy, the State could not remain inactive while a
whole segment of the population was disenfranchised." Some
affirmative action to guarantee voting rights was required.
In Tery v. Adams,9" the Court found state inaction impermis-
sible in the Texas Democrats' follow-up effort to disenfranchise
Blacks. The Court chided the State for "permit[ting] a flagrant
abuse of [electoral] processes" when the results were primary and
general elections that became "no more than perfunctory ratifiers
of the choice that has already been made in Jaybird elections
from which Negroes have been excluded."99
State inaction, in light of the State's ability to prevent race
discrimination, was also unacceptable in Evans v. Newton.' After
years of municipally-controlled trusteeship over a segregated park
devised to the City, the Court refused to infer that mere formal
94 The Court initially gave its constitutional imprimatur to the State of Texas, which,
through its inertia, appeared to provide official sanction to "private" (state Democratic
Party) racial exclusion in primary voting. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935). In two
previous cases, the Court unexceptionably struck down Texas statutes that permitted racial
exclusion in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Nixon v. Hemdon, 273 U.S.
536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
95 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (overruling Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935)).
96 Id. at 653 n.6, 661.
97 Id. at 664. ("This grant to the people of the opportunity for choice is not to be
nullified by a State through casting its electoral process in a form which permits a pri-
vate organization to practice racial discrimination in the election.").
98 345 U.S. 461 (1953). Undeterred by the Smith decision, the Democratic Party of
Texas tried again to oust African-Americans from meaningful participation in the state
electoral process by fashioning a "pre-primary" under the auspices of the racially exclusive
"private" Jaybird Democratic Association. The Association, as Justice Black pointed out in
a decision that mustered no majority, adopted "precisely the same qualifications [for
office] as those prescribed by Texas entitling electors to vote at county-operated prima-
ries." Id. at 469. Although the state did not "control" this part of the elective process.
"for more than fifty years," this had been "the only effective part ... of the elective
process that determines who shall rule and govern in the county." Id.
99 Id.
100 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
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severance of the trusteeship relationship ended municipal segrega-
tion. Under the circumstances, the majority read a silent record as
creating the inference that the City "remain[ed] entwined in the
management or control of the park, . . . [and therefore] re-
main[ed] subject to ... the Fourteenth Amendment.".. The au-
thority it had previously exploited required more than mere for-
mal disentanglement-it required an affirmative demonstration of
clean hands."2
The final case that illustrates the potency of inaction in the
context of racial discrimination is the Court's 1991 Edmonson deci-
101 Id. at 301. As Justice White noted, in light of the City's clear wish to avoid poten-
tial Fourteenth Amendment violations, the better inference from a silent record was that
the City had severed all ties. Id. at 305 (White, J., concurring); accord id. at 318 (Harlan,
J., dissenting). Instead, as Justice Harlan noted in dissent and without a hint of irony,
the majority was moved by "human impulses" rather than sound constitutional principles,
as if justices could eliminate their humanity in decision-making. Id. at 315.
This radical impulse to sever emotion from judicial process is reminiscent of the
distinction made by some of the ante-bellum courts confronted with emancipation litiga-
tion based on state law. See, e.g., State v. Post, 20 NJ.L. 368 (1845) (distinguishing be-
tween "feeling" and "legal intelligence"); see also ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 55-
59 (1975). Justice Blackmun, dissenting in DeSlianey, makes much the same point with
respect to the majority opinion. See.DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 212 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The language and structure of the DeShaney opinion are also reminiscent of state
court judges writing at the turn of the century. Such judges, one historian has noted,
read their state constitutions "as instruments of caution . .. read[ing] them as instru-
ments that preserve[] historic truths about democratic society and right reason." LAW-
RENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 317 (1973). They used their authority
to preserve the rights of the states.
I do not mean to suggest that state court authority promoted state intervention. To
the contrary, the period was marked by a negative conception of the state. See, e.g., SID-
NEY FINE, LAtSSEz FAIRE AND THE'GENERAL WELFARE STATE ch. V (1956); ARNOLD M.
PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW,: ATTrITUDFS OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-
1895 (1960).
102 The Court, in effect, erected a presumption based on its view of human nature.
Macon's City fathers had stood idly by and permitted one of its most treasured City re-
sources to be used as an instrument of apartheid for several generations. During that
time, the park enjoyed state tax benefits as well as City services. Given that history, the
City had failed to disprove that its imprimatur had "dissipated ipso facto by the appoint-
ment of 'private' trustees." Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 296 (1966). Viewed in this
light the Court's holding is instructive: "We only hold that where the tradition of munici-
pal control had become firmly established, we cannot take judicial notice that the mere
substitution of trustees instantly transferred this park from the public to the private sec-
tor." Id. at 301.
There was, of course, what many, including Justice Harlan, viewed as an alternative
.public function" rationale for the decision. Id. at 301-02. It is at least worth noting,
however, that this alternative was not described as a holding, and it seems to have been
proffered more as a way of buttressing the Court's prior conclusion, based on the history
and nature of the park, than as a truly independent ratio decidend.
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sion, holding that private civil litigants could not use peremptory
challenges to exclude prospective jurors on the basis of race. t03
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, tried mightily to squeeze
the facts into two recognized state action tests. He argued that the
Lugar inquiry,"" an analysis that emerged in a nonrace situation,
controlled. Lugar created a two-part test asking (1) whether the
claimed violation resulted from the exercise of a right grounded
in State authority; and (2) if so, whether it was fair to attribute
the private party's conduct to the State.05 The first part was easi-
ly answered affirmatively; the second was a struggle, ultimately
decided on the basis of the "overt, significant assistance of state
officials" the attorney received.' To prove his point, Justice Ken-
nedy cited a host of federal statutes that generally implicated juror
selection, concluding with the observation that when the attorney
exercises a peremptory challenge, "the judge advises the juror he
or she has been excused." ' 7
Although the dissenting justices seemed to get the better of
the doctrinal dispute,08 Justice Kennedy was nonetheless ex-
103 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991). Edmonson is among the
progeny of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that prosecutors may not
use their peremptory challenges to discriminate on the basis of race).
104 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
105 Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620 (citing Luga; 457 U.S. at 939-42).
106 Id. at 622 (quoting Tulsa Professional Collection Sers., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S.
478, 485 (1988)).
107 Id. at 624. Justice Kennedy also found support for the state action holding in the
"traditional government function" strand of analysis. After concluding that the jury is a
"quintessential governmental body, having no attributes of a private actor," Justice Kenne-
dy cited Terry v. Adams, one of the "white primary cases," see supra, text accompanying
notes 98, 99, for the proposition that "[i]f a government confers on a private body the
power to choose the government's employees or officials, the private party will be bound
by the constitutional mandate of race-neutrality." Ednonson, 500 U.S. at 625. This was
especially the case in the jury selection arena, he argued, because "[t]hough the motive
of a peremptory challenge may be to protect private interest, the objective of jury selec-
tion is to determine representation on a governmental body." Id. at 626.
108 As Justice O'Connor pointed out, the evidence marshalled to support the essen-
tially empirical notion of "significant assistance"-establishing qualifications and voter lists,
devising forms to fill out, paying per diems, and so on-have nothing to do with the dis-
cretionary nature of the challenge. Ednonson, 500 U.S. at 634 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Moreover, the dissent also noted accurately that in the ordinary nonrace-related constitu-
tional challenge, the part)' seeking to establish state action must demonstrate that the
government "'is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.'" Id.
at 632 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
At the very least, as applied by Justice Kennedy, the word "responsible" must be replaced
with "permits," for no one claimed that the decision to discriminate against a prospective
juror on the basis of race was the responsibility of the trial court beyond the fact that
the judge could prevent it if he had knowledge of it.
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pounding an important point. Juries are democratic representatives
in the adjudication process. They are surrounded by the trappings
of government authority-American and state flags, honorable
incantations that begin the proceedings, judges dressed in cere-
monial garb sitting high above and presiding over the trial, and
an order and ritual that government creates and controls. In this
sense, Justice Kennedy's citation to Burton that government's "pow-
er, property, and prestige" stands behind the discrimination is
surely correct."° The more powerful analysis of this particular
issue, though, was provided by Judge Alvin Rubin, dissenting from
the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision below:
[A] judge is intimately involved in the process that Tocqueville
termed America's "greatest advantage" in "rub[bing] off th[e]
private selfishness which is the rust of society." By . . . per-
mit[ting] peremptory challenges based on race, the rust of the
judge's approval of discrimination rubs off onto society, corrod-
ing the national character by giving private prejudice the impri-
matur of state approval."'
On this theory, it is simply impermissible for the State to "estab-
lish and maintain a system of jury selection that authorizes blatant
racial discrimination by litigants using the courts set up by, paid
for, and operated by the government..'' . To do so is to corrupt
the system by "complicity in the facilitation of racial bigotry.""' 2
In each of the race-related cases, inaction was simply insuffl-
The dissent's analysis of the government finction strand of state action also seemed
more faithful to recent precedent. The "government function" rationale has fallen on
hard times. In more recent cases, the party seeking to employ the test has failed to meet
the "exclusivity" requirement, i.e., the requirement that the governing function a private
party undertakes is one over which the State traditionally enjoyed exclusive domain. Id. at
640 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Flagg Bros., Inc., v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157
(1978) and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)). But if, for
example, public defenders, who are paid by the state, are not thereby made state actors,
Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), and if they too not only use, but are also
prevented from the racially discriminatory use of, peremptory challenges, see Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), it is only with difficulty that one can conclude that the use
of peremptory challenges is "exclusive" to the state.
109 Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 624 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715, 725 (1961)).
110 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 233 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(Rubin, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (quoting 1 ALEXIS DE ToCQUEVILI.E, DEMOcRAC"
IN AMERIcA 295-96 (Vintage Books ed. 1945)). Judge Rubin's opinion is ably discussed by
his former law clerk. See Peter M. Shane, The Rust That Corrodes: State Action, Free Speech,
and Responsibility, 52 LA. L. REV. 1585, 1588-91 (1992).
111 Edmonson, 895 F.2d at 233.
112 Shane, supra note 110, at 1590.
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cient to discharge the States' obligations. When the Court manag-
es precedent in this context it seems to appreciate that it cannot
ignore the role it plays in shaping who we are as a people. Recall
that in Burton, Shelley, Edmonson, and the other cases discussed
above, no one claimed that state officials acting at the periphery
of the private misconduct themselves participated in or even ac-
tively encouraged the discriminatory acts." 3 At least in retrospect,
it was sufficient for a finding of state action that in each case a
similar paradigm existed: the State acted at the periphery of the
alleged unconstitutional racial discrimination; it knew of or had
the wherewithal to discover the existence of discrimination; and it
had the power to prevent it, but chose instead a path of deliber-
ate indifference. Unless we indulge the counterintuitive assump-
tion that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments intended different constructions of the same words
as a function of context, we are justified in concluding as a matter
of inference from the Framers' intent that the constitutional re-
quirement of state action need be no greater than that paradigm.
And yet, the Court has been dramatically less likely to find state
action outside the race context.
2. Nonrace and Action: the Search for Culpable State Misconduct
For many of the reasons set out in the discussion of Edmonson
above, the paradigm I have drawn from the race-related cases
clearly will not suffice when issues other than racial discrimination
come under scrutiny. Mere state knowledge and tolerance of,
accompanied with an ability to prevent, the wrongful conduct is
insufficient. Rather, in these cases, something very close to a state
command or direction to engage in the impermissible conduct is
required. In the cases described in this subsection, the Court
searches for state action that appears intentional or at least de-
signed to effect the private misconduct. Current controlling doc-
trine in nonrace-related cases is drawn from the Court's 1982
Lugar opinion and its two-part test."' Recall that the test, which
113 A significant exception to this line of cases is Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407
U.S. 163 (1972), in which the Court found no state action by a lodge that received its li-
quor license from the state and refused to serve blacks because of their race. Professor
Tribe makes the important point, however, that a constitutional claim would surely have
encountered no state action barrier had it been brought against the liquor control board
that issued the license. TRIBE, supra note 13, § 18-7, at 1717-18.
114 The pedigree for Lugar's two-part 'Joint participant" test, which seemed to col-
lapse all prior categories of state action into one formulation, of course precedes that
[Vol. 70:1
MORAL IMPLICATIONS
purports to synthesize several decades of the Court's state action
jurisprudence, requires (1) a finding that the claimed violation
resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege grounded in state
authority; and (2) if it did, that it was fair to attribute the private
party's wrongful conduct to the State.1 5  In virtually every
nonrace-related case that has reached the Court on this second
issue, the Court has required something very close to intentional
action by the government agency or official implicated.
In companion cases decided during the Lugar term, the Court
steadfastly refused to find state action. In Blum v. Yaretsky, for
example, the Court held that unless the State "exercised coercive
power or has provided such significant encouragement, either
overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that
of the State."..6 That the State "approv[ed] of or acquiesce[d]
in" the transfer, without hearings, of Medicaid patients in a state-
case. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1978); Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Inis, 407 U.S. 163, 175-76 n.3, 176-77 (1972); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
One set of casebook authors has advanced the intriguing suggestion that Ednonson
attempts a new synthesis of state action case law. See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 204 (1993). It is undeniably the case that Justice
Kennedy's elaboration of Lugar's second inquiry appears to set out a three part, conjunc-
tive analysis to determine if Lugar is met. He writes the following:
Our precedents establish that, in determining whether a particular action . . . is
governmental in character, it is relevant to examine the following: the extent to
which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits; whether the ac-
tor is performing a traditional governmental function; and whether the injury
caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority.
Edionson, 500 U.S. at 621-22 (citations omitted).
To put the matter bluntly, for a number of reasons I am not convinced that Lugar,
which seems to extend state action in ways that are at best inconsistent with some prior
precedent, see supra note 107, in fact contracts the doctrine's coverage, a necessary infer-
ence if Edmonson reflects this new synthesis. (Is there any plausible way, for example, that
Delaware's ownership of a parking facility in Burton could be characterized as a "tradi-
tional governmental function"?)
In the first place, each of the cases cited was one in which the Court found the
state action requirement satisfied. Thus, if the Edmonson formulation requires the plaintiff
to meet all three prongs of Lugar's second part, we would be left with the mildly
counterintuitive notion that none of the supporting precedent could meet this new test.
Second, I simply cannot accept the inference that cases like Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991 (1982), and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), both of which required a
targeted state policy, now fall before Edmonson's less restrictive reading of this prong. See
supra note 107. Finally, a new synthesis faithfully applied would be impossible to satisfy.
Rather, the three parts seem to be alternative ways to establish state action, each of
which "is relevant to examine." Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621.
115 Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620 (citing Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939-42).
116 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
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subsidized nursing facility made no difference." 7
The Court similarly disposed of due process and free speech
claims lodged by a discharged teacher against her "private" school
employer, though the employer received virtually all its financing
from the State and virtually all of its problem students via state
referrals. Noting that the State had "relatively little involvement in
personnel matters," although it did approve initial hiring decisions,
the Court in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn quoted the language set out
above in the Blum opinion." 8 It noted, moreover, that the dis-
charge decisions were "not compelled or even influenced by any
state regulation;" indeed, "[the State] showed relatively little inter-
est in the school's personnel matters.""' 9
Not even a congressionally authorized monopoly over the use
of national language and symbols suffices to create state action
unless government "coerce[s]" or "encourage[s]" the very decision
plaintiff seeks to challenge. 2 ' San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
United States Olympic Committee found no state action where the
USOC refused to authorize use of the word "Olympic" by the Gay
Olympics. Only if the state actor lends "overt, significant assis-
tance" that is "pervasive and substantial" to the conduct that caus-
es a loss, such as a command that defective notice be given, will
the Court find the requisite state action.1
2'
In these cases, the official conduct required to attribute "pri-
vate" behavior to the State-encouraging the transfer of patients,
maintaining a policy that was "compelled or influenced" by state
regulatory authority, coercing a discriminatory decision, and posi-
tively commanding the filing of a notice-partakes of intentional
or designed activities. What is curious about this line of cases is
that the Fourteenth Amendment already requires a level of culpa-
bility akin to intent in order to state a claim for a violation of its
underlying provisions. 2 2 The upshot is that the party seeking to
117 Id. at 1004-05.
118 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 836 (1982).
119 Id. at 841.
120 San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522, 546 (1987) (finding no state action where USOC refused to authorize use of the
word "Olympic" for Gay Olympics).
121 Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1988).
Finding that the judge's overt assistance was "significant" is an overstatement; the judge
merely opened the estate and duly informed creditors. On the willingness of the Court
to find state action more readily when the allegation is a deprivation of property rather
than liberty, see supra note 84 (cases cited).
122 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987) (holding that the Equal
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establish "state action" must satisfy the court at the outset of the
action that she can prove the underlying culpability necessary to
violate the due process and equal protection provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment itself.'23 In these cases, the state action
requirement becomes a method of short-circuiting claims by main-
taining judicial control over and disposing of the intent issue be-
fore trial.'24
3. Nonrace-related, Culpable, Custodial Inaction
Where race is the issue, inaction may constitute action, at
least when the government is aware of the existence of a potential
constitutional deprivation, operates within or near the boundaries
of the misconduct and has the wherewithal'to prevent it. When
issues other than race are implicated, the Court generally requires
culpable, hands-on action. In the narrow range of nonrace cases
discussed in this subsection, culpable inaction can create state
action.
The Court recognized a common law duty to attend to the
health needs of inmates in Estelle v. Gamble."s The rationale was
uncomplicated: "An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat
his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will
not be met."'26 The State's obligation to fulfill basic health and
security need not depend on either the identity of the culprit or,
for that matter, the imprisonment of the victim. For example, in
Youngberg v. Romeo,'27 the Court recognized the State's Four-
Protection Clause requires establishing that the challenged activity was undertaken "'be-
cause of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse [consequences]" (quoting Personnel Adm'r
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256i 279 (1979))); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (requir-
ing more than negligence to demonstrate a "deprivation" under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986) (same).
123 There is, of course, an irony in this development, at least as applied to cases in
which the only hands-on state involvement is essentially ministerial: The state escapes
liability if it does absolutely nothing, but incurs liability if its active participation is non-
discretionary. Compare Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) with North Georgia
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975). See generally Paul Brest, State Action
and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296
(1982).
124 Professor Lewis and I have noted a similar trend throughout § 1983 litigation.
Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 30, at 805.
125 429 U.S. 97 (1976). The common jailer's duty has a long pedigree. See, e.g., WIL-
LIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 349 n.41 (4th ed. 1971) (cases cited).
126 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); accord West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42
(1988).
127 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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teenth Amendment obligation to protect a severely mentally re-
tarded adult from physical injury suffered, not at the hands of the
State, but at the hands of other patients in the hospital. This
"'historic liberty interest,"' the Court wrote, "is not extinguished by
lawful confinement,"'28 a conclusion that necessarily implies the
existence of a right independent of incarceration.
29
Finally, nearly a decade before DeShaney, the Court had hinted
that the State might face civil liability for the death of a fifteen
year old girl murdered by a parolee in Martinez v. California.'
Although a number of immunity issues drove the cluttered opin-
ion, the ambiguous resolution of the § 1983 claim-that the
State's action in releasing the perpetrator did not violate the Four-
teenth Amendment-provided a basis for potential liability in
DeShaney. The Martinez Court seemed to base its decision that the
State could not face liability on three separate conclusions: (1)
that the decision to release did not amount to "state action"; (2)
that the allegations did not rise to the level of a "deprivation";
and, (3) that the chain of causation was too attenuated.' But
this last ground was framed to suggest that a future victim of state
inaction might state a claim for deprivation of life:
Her life was taken by the parolee five months after his re-
lease .... Further, the parole board was' not aware that
appellants' decedent, as distinguished from the public at large,
faced any special danger. We need not and do not decide that
a parole officer could never be deemed to "deprive" someone
of life by action taken in connection with the release of a pris-
oner on parole. But we do hold that at least under the par-
ticular circumstances of this parole decision, appellants'
decedent's death is too remote a consequence.
3 2
On the strength of this passage, one lower court found potential
liability for the failure of a child protective service to protect a
128 Id. at 315 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (freedom from
corporal punishment)) (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (freedom of prison-
ers from cruel and unusual punishment in conditions of confinement)).
129 Motion For Leave To File Brief Amnirus Curiae and Brief Amicus Curiae of the
American Ciil Liberties Union Children's Rights Project et a]. at 12, DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Social Serns., No. 87-154 (on file with author).
130 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
131 Id. at 284-85. In DeShaney, Justice Rehnquist rather curiously adopted only the
third alternative as the holding of Martinez. DeShany, 489 U.S. at 197 n.4. This is curious
because the third alternative is the only "holding" of the three that implicates a potential
duty based on DeShaney's facts.
132 Martinez, 444 U.S. at 285.
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child, despite the lack of a custodial relationship.3 A second
court indicated that it would find liability in a proper case.11 In
language that could have been taken in part from the race-related
state action cases discussed above, both courts listed the factors it
would consider crucial: custody or prior custody by the State, a
formal state desire to provide affirmative protection, and knowl-
edge of the victim's plight.3 5 DeShaney interpreted this line of
cases at the lowest level of abstraction.3 6
V.. DESHANEY AND THE MORALITY OF JUDGING
On the eve of the decision, the question of whether to find
liability in Joshua's case was open. The unambiguous intent of the
Fourteenth Amendment's drafters and ratifiers did not compel the
decision. Indeed, the Court had ample room to move within the
joints of past precedent and, in fact, had predicted just this sort of
case in Marinez.3  The Justices' personal predilections about
their roles as judges and the level of generality at which they
applied precedent would determine the outcome.
They carried those predispositions to the public/private dis-
tinction, a pervasive part of our constitutional jurisprudence, and
one that is by its nature highly susceptible to change based on the
133 Estate of Bailey By Oare v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 510 (3d Cir. 1985).
134 Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 195 (4th Cir. 1984) (deciding the case on immu-
nity grounds), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
135 Bailey, 768 F.2d at 509 (citing Jensen, 747 F.2d at 194 n.1l).
136 "Taken together, they stand only for the proposition that when the State takes a
person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes
upon it a corresponding duty to assume responsibility for his safety and general well-be-
ing." DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200. Despite noting the DSS's careful, even macabre, re-
cord of abuse and that the DSS's failure to take custody in the light of manifest 'need
deprived Joshua of meaningful life, the Court implicitly rejected the relevance of past
custody: "The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the
individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the
limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf." Id. at 200.
Having placed no "limitation . . . on his freedom to act," id., the State owed four-year-
old Joshua no duty; the door to federal relief was closed.
On the appropriate level of generality in constitutional adjudication, compare Mi-
chael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6. (1989) (identifying and applying the "most
specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, [the]
asserted right"). For a discussion of the Court's general precedent that moved toward an
affirmative duty arising under the Due Process Clause, see David P. Currie, Positive and
Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 864 (1986).
137 It would require overstatement to conclude that the emerging legal landscape
pointed toward potential liability in DeShany. See supra text accompanying note 75. The
conclusion in the text is unexceptionable.
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idiosyncratic views of the justices. It is, in fact, a moving target.
Criticized by feminists,"' Critical Legal Studies scholars,"' and
others,"'°  the distinction nonetheless exists "' and will un-
doubtedly remain an important, if troublesome feature of our
constitutional order for the foreseeable future. 42 If we follow the
Court and agree that the distinction plays some role in maintain-
ing a part of our life free from federal regulation and constitu-
tional restraint, then we must ask at least two questions: how, if at
all, does a case like DeShaney serve us, and what, if anything, does
it tell us about the society of which we are a part?
A. Deshaney's Doctrine
On the doctrinal level, at least outside the context of race,
DeShaney stood state action on its head. Prevailing notions insist
that state action serves individual liberty."'3 It must be noted,
however, that this freedom from federal constraints is achieved in
the service of the Fourteenth Amendment,'4 4  which insures
138 See, e.g., MIACKINNON, supra note 65, at 91; Olsen, The Family and the Market, supra
note 65. See generally Gavison, supra note 14, at 1.
139 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982); Karl E. Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law,
130 id. at 1358.
140 See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 60, at 402-03 (noting that the categories are "ex-
tremely malleable"); Seidman, supra note 82, at 1007 (describing the boundary between
public and private spheres as "shifting, uncertain, and contested"); Weinstein, supra note
55, at 27. See generally Symposium on the State Action Doctrine, 10 CONST. CoMM. 309, 309-
441 (1993).
141 My own position is largely congruent with that of Professor Gavison, supra note
14. I find the distinction both necessary and unavoidable: necessary because I cannot
imagine the value of or pleasure in many exercises over whose access I do not retain a
large measure of control, and unavoidable because, while acknowledging that much of
the distinction is contingent and contestable, it seems nonetheless to enjoy a universal if
varied existence. See Hampshire, supra note 46, at 44.
142 The comment in the text is deliberately understated. To rid ourselves of the
distinction would require a paradigm shift that I cannot now imagine. At the very least,
the Court would have to overturn the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), and we as a
polity would have to repudiate formally the Establishment Clause, which demands the
split, as does the First Amendment itself, and as do our more general notions about
freedom of conscience.
143 "Careful adherence to the 'state action' requirement preserves an area of indi-
vidual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial power." Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982); seeJakosa, supra note 13, at 207 (conclud-
ing that the state action requirement permits individuals to make certain choices that
enhance "individual autonomy, individual dignity, and pluralism"); see also supra note 12
(cases cited).
144 Some conduct attributable to government is required to state a claim against the
federal government as well. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S 614
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against state intrusions on human dignity and autonomy. It also
bears remembering in this context that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment operates against the states in two very different, but very
active ways; and both of these ways demand the exercise of federal
authority. First, the federal judiciary is called upon to restrain
entirely certain state options-the command of the Due Process
Clause. Second, the federal judiciary must demand at least mini-
mum rationality with respect to other state options-the command
of the Equal Protection Clause. The Fourteenth Amendment re-
flects the understanding that both federal judicial oversight and
federal legislation may be necessary to insure individual dignity in
post-Reconstruction America; Congress received specific authoriza-
tion to "enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article" against the States."'5
Thus, the conventional view of state action as a limitation on
federal judicial power"k---and especially the current Court's im-
poverished conception of that view, a sort of doubling of the re-
strictive use of federal judicial authority-presents an apparent
paradox: The Fourteenth Amendment exists as a federally guaran-
teed mandate of individual security (and autonomy) from inten-
tionally arbitrary state conduct; but the "state action" language,
also a part of that amendment, purports to limit federal intrusions
into state realms of control, purportedly to protect the individual.
Race aside, far from serving individual liberty, the state action
doctrine, shorn of its original historical purpose and divorced
from its unitary linguistic formulation, often serves only an unbri-
dled effort to protect the State's fisc, a rather unprincipled sort of
federalism.
B. Some Moral Limits on Judging: Deshaney 's Jurisprudence
We honor the rule of law in our constitutional order as neces-
sary to harness our temptation to aggrandize power. As Professor
Sargentovich has noted, advocates of the rule of law "take[] to
heart the liberal fear of political power, and seek[] to constrain
such power by means of law.""47 So we continue to pay homage
(1991); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
145 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. In fact, congressional control of the Fourteenth
Amendment is in theory potent enough to override jurisdictional limitations imposed on
the federal courts by the Eleventh Amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,
456 (1976).
146 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
147 Thomas 0. Sargento,ich, The Contemporaiy Debate About Legislative-Executive Separation
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to Montesquieu" even as we recognize the impossibility of gov-
erning within a rigid conception of separation of powers.'49 Few
would challenge or seek to undermine the basic structure of our
government, driven by the framework ideal that legislators legis-
late, the executive executes, and the judiciary judges. At the same
time, a conception that limits the judicial rule to exercising "a
limited veto over legislative and executive action . . . severely dis-
torts reality."'
1. Public and Private
The State placed no "limitation" on Joshua's "freedom to act."
These chilling allusions to freedom and the "free world" lack all
coherence in reference to a brain damaged four year old. The
gravamen of the complaint was the DSS's failure to remove this
child from his home-that DSS should have temporarily limited
Joshua's freedom to remain with his natural father so that it might
be preserved for a time when it was meaningful. What is the "free
world" that these decision-makers envision? How did they pass the
decision's moral moment impervious to the irrelevance of any
conception of freedom as applied to three and four year old chil-
dren? The simple truth is that no justification for the state action
doctrine as a servant of liberty was advanced in DeShaney.
No traditional rationale for carving out and designating as
"private" an area of human conduct free from government control
was advanced by the DeShaney opinion. In fact, the individual inter-
est in "privacy" as a denial of public "access" was affirmatively
denigrated by the Court's opinion.'' If DeShaney speaks at all to
of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 430, 451 (1987).
148 C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAW'S, Book XI, ch. 6, at 202 (T. Nugent trans.,
1750, David W. Carrithers ed., 1977) ("When the legislative and executive powers are
united in the same person"); cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) ("The Fram-
ers provided [for] a vigorous Legislative Branch and a separate and wholly independent
Executive Branch. ... )
149 As I have noted elsewhere, a rigid model of total inter-branch independence is
not only inconsistent with the ability of government to function, but with Madison's con-
ception of "partial agency" as well. Theodore Y. Blumoff, Illusions of Constitutional
Decisionmaking: Politics and the Tenure Powers in the Court, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1079, 1144
(1988). For the Madisonian conception, see id. at 1087-88.
150 Graham Hughes, Social Justice and the Courts, in NOMOS XV: THE LIMITS OF THE
LAW, supra note 74, at 115 (taking what is by contemporary standards a very traditional
view of the role of federal courts).
151 Nor does the decision advance our notions of privacy as "agency" or "interest." In
fact, I cannot even frame the question one would ask to determine if these senses of the
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incentives for agency intervention in similar cases, it is to create
disincentives, despite the presence of state statutes designed to
protect children from abuse. From the standpoint of potential
federal liability the state is better off permitting our many Joshuas
to remain in their abusive conditions. Standing on the sidelines
provides a safe harbor, but it does not advance the liberty interests
of our future Joshuas.
Freedom's most ardent defenders and theoreticians acknowl-
edge that government intervention is justified-some would say
justified only-for the purposes of preventing one individual from
harming another.5 2 How then do we explain DeShaney's result
when it was not compelled by our understanding of state action?
And here it is well to recall the lesson from the race category of
cases and the thinness of the distinction between state action and
inaction. These decisions clearly provide that it was not essential.
for a finding of state action that the State's agent had beaten
Joshua. As a matter of parsing the terms "[n]o state shall" and
"nor shall any State," little is constitutionally compelled.
Moreover, DeShaney's suggestion that liability might have fol-
lowed had the DSS placed Joshua in a foster home where a foster
parent had beaten him or, alternatively, had he still been in custo-
dy indicates the weight the fact of custody must bear. The
decision's facts, though, were fortuitous in this regard, turning in
a large part on timing: Joshua had been in the state's custody but
was not at the time of the injury. The custody/freedom distinction
would suggest that had Joshua been beaten by his father during
an unsupervised noncustodial visit liability could follow. When the
gist of the complaint is a reckless failure to intervene, federal
physical protection for the most defenseless members of our com-
munities cannot turn on such a distinction, especially in light of
detailed knowledge of the potential for grave harm, a state statuto-
ry duty to prevent the harm, and the undoubted ability to do so.
2. The External Morality of Judging
This article began with an appreciation of Professor Fuller's
two insights: that contemporary moral norms frame a court's work
and that even an advertent effort by members of the Supreme
Court to avoid affecting public values affects public values. The
word were implicated. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
152 See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
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Supreme Court cannot escape its role in shaping public moral-
ity.
153
In some contexts, the existence and exercise of the Court's
moral office is clear. In refusing to permit the public's "irrational
prejudice against the mentally retarded" to dictate a City's zoning
policy, 54 and in declining to allow even the reality of "[p]rivate
biases" in the form of widespread, public "racial prejudice" to
dictate the outcome of a child custody battle,'55 the Court did
more than interpret the Constitution. Writing about that same
Constitution little more than a generation after the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court had stated that "[i]f one
race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution . . . cannot
put them upon the same plane."5 ' One can see in Palmore a
Court that was unwilling to deny its role as guardian of our collec-
tive commitment to justice for people of color, one that reinter-
preted the Constitution in light of contemporary moral values and
with the hope of reducing private appetites for discrimination.' 57
In still another context, adherence to a moral warrant for
conduct is unexceptionable. A generation after he wrote the state-
ment quoted above, Professor Fuller addressed what he called the
"internal morality" of law, an essentially procedural commitment to
clarity, written findings, fair process and so on."a Commenting
on this "internal morality," Professor Eisenberg noted that "adjudi-
cation has a moral force, and this force is in major part a func-
tion of those elements that distinguish adjudication from all other
forms of ordering."5 9 To lose the distinguishing feature of adju-
dication could, in the long term, result in "forfeiture of the moral
force of the judicial role."" °
In other cases, like DeShaney, the need for justices to make
decisions influenced by their sense of the morality of judging is
less clear and less obviously derivable from constitutional text or
the adjudicatory form, but no less demanding and demanded. In
153 BICKFEL, supra note 5, at 30-33.
154 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
155 Palmore v. Sadoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) ("Pri ate biases may be outside the
reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.").
156 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1886).
157 Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1129,
1130 (1986).
158 See supra note 4.
159 Milton A. Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An




these cases the moral imperative is "external" to the process and
located within each of the justices and the community he or she
serves. It is an exaction owing in large part to the nature of lan-
guage and the dynamism of American society. Language-and our
consequent understanding of it-is susceptible to change with
time. Thus as we read our Constitution, we earnestly hope to re-
cover some sense of what its drafters had in mind, for without
that sense we necessarily undermine a principal value of
democracy.""' Yet often all we can legitimately expect is an ap-
proximation of contemporaneous meaning. Our finest efforts at
defining issues of constitutional adjudication, especially those aris-
ing at the margin of our understanding of text and tradition,'62
more often than not yield various alternatives of meaning, i.e., the
context of the text and not the text itself.6" It is in this manner
that "aspects of the interpretive process . . . are intimately linked
with the concerns of a justice seeking social order.""e' To deny
that individual moral commitments play a part in interpretation
on these issues is to engage in self-deception or simultaneously to
disavow one's own humanity and practice a form of idolatry-to
purport to translate a revealed text that is incapable of self-revela-
don.
My examination of DeShaney suggests that not only has the
Rehnquist Court embraced a minimalist conception of individual
rights in the face of majoritarian preferences, 65 but a minimalist
161 Although specifically directed at the interpretation of statutes, Professor Sunstein's
explanation of the "democratic pedigree" of textualism rests on these same democratic
principles. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 113-14 (1990).
162 Cf Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication:
Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 250 (1988) (arguing that the
Framers' intent "will often be presumptively clear from the language the constitution mak-
ers chose. Beyond that, it will be enough in most cases to learn what people, at the
time, generally meant when they used certain language and what people involved in the
process of enactment thought was at issue.") (first emphasis added). Unfortunately, the
ordinary process Professor Kay describes fails precisely on these challenging issues.
163 See generally J.GA POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND HISTORY (1971); Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History
of Ideas, 8 HIST. & THEORY 3, 38 (1969).
164 Hughes, supra note 150, at 116 (taking a very traditional view of the role of
courts). I do not know whether Professor Hughes would today approve my use of his
quote, a point which illustrates the statement in the text at which this note is directed.
165 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (consigning protection of
the free exercise of religion to the political process); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989) (limiting the applicability of newly declared constitutional rights in habeas corpus
proceedings); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court 1988 Term Foreword: The Van-
ishing Constitution, 103 HARv. L. REV. 43 (1989).
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conception of the justices' role in shaping public morality. This
conception threatens the integrity of the Fourteenth Amendment
of which the state action canon-one medium of their moral
currency--is a part. This barren understanding of state action also
gives short shrift to the Justices' responsibilities in and for a com-
munity bound only by its shared civil religion. By yielding their
moral office, the Justices encourage the status quo, which is itself
a statement of moral commitment. In that process they waste their
own precious judicial resource-their moral authority-and squan-
der valuable opportunities to enhance the individual autonomy of
those whom the state action qualification was meant to serve.
Most tragically, the Justices also undermine faith in our one
shared, near sacred166 text, the Constitution. We are, as many be-
fore me have noted,167 like no other polity in history, for we
share no common religious, ethnic or even tribal culture. Our
only shared culture is legal and even that culture is only partially
shared; each state's laws are shards in a mosaic whose multi-cast
pieces frequently clash. Thus, the only glue that genuinely fastens
together the varied tiles of this extraordinary political creation is
the Constitution-our holiest, most revered communal document.
Respect for its high priests and priestesses is essential, but that
respect is now threatened. DeShaney is, in my view, immoral, and it
creates peril for our body politic that comes in no small part from
the perception that we the students of our sacred text take from
the work of its most authoritative exegetical scholars. The message
many of us propagate is that they-and the state whose action
they insulate from national accountability-do not care.
In this nation lacking religious, ethnic, and cultural common-
alities, the protections-and the perception of protections-flowing
from our national unifying document are crucial. The protections
afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment constitute recognition of
the deeply offensive nature of harms perpetrated by the state and
its agencies.1" The Court must, therefore, articulate a powerful
166 Whether this shared perception of sacredness is a good or bad thing is, in the
context, beside the point. The furor over the flag burning cases demonstrates the notion
in text a fortiori. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. John-
son, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
167 Much of the work of theologian Stanley Hauenws has been directed at finding a
cure for this absence of a common moral heritage. See, e.g., STANLEY HAUERVWAS, COMMU-
NITY OF CHARACTER ch. 4 (1981).
168 Concurring in the seminal case Monroe v. Pape, Justice Harlan underscored the
symbolic virtue of a federal remedy: the deprivation of a federally guaranteed right by
action of the government causes unique damage, demanding a specially carved out reme-
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countervailing interest to deny guarantees enshrined in the
amendment under the circumstances prevailing in DeShaney: pre-
existing state power, state awareness of the potential for particular-
ized grave harm which it actively seeks to prevent, and reckless
state actions at or near the boundary of "private" misconduct.69
Instead of expounding authoritatively some interest that might
serve as a counterweight, the Court served up an indigestible syllo-
gism and a side order of gratuitous prophylaxis: If the state had
moved too soon, it could have faced charges of intruding into the
parent-child relationship.' Although this relationship is one we
would denigrate at our peril, it could not be the case that, for
fear of saddling the county with liability, the Court was willing to
recognize an associational right of Randy DeShaney to abuse his
son in the "free world."
At the moral moment, when, given the open nature of the
question asked, the Justices were compelled to apply individual
external moralities, they told us that the Due Process clause will
not help, that our Constitution is indifferent to the reckless con-
duct of these state officials. In the free world, freedom means
absence of federal protection and absence of federal concern for
the most vulnerable members of our community. How absurd it
seems to consign a brain damaged four year old to life in this free
world where such state-perpetrated thoughtlessness lays claim to
complete constitutional immunity. And so DeShaney, from the per-
spective of the majority, becomes an easy case dealing primarily
with money: Will we require the state to pay?
Applying an external morality to judging is neither good nor
bad; it is simply unavoidable. The application of that morality can,
however, be an instrument of good or evil. In DeShaney it was used
for evil, although the Court attempted to disguise the external
morality implicit in its decision by wrapping the opinion in the
rhetoric of inevitability. It was an evil as much for its implicit state-
ment about our Constitution in the hands of the federal judiciary
as for its immediate result. The Justices ignored entirely the
constitution's moral and symbolic power.
dy. "[A] deprivation" of a constitutional right is significantly different from and more
serious than a violation of a state right and therefore deserves a different remedy even
though the same act may constitute both a state tort and the deprivation of a constitu-
tional right." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
169 See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1993).
170 DeShaney v. Winnebago County, Dep't of Social Serns., 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989)
(Rehnquist, CJ.).
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